ナガオカ ナルト
NAGAOKA Naruto 永岡 成人 所属 広島修道大学 経済科学部 職種 准教授 |
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言語種別 | 英語 |
発行・発表の年月 | 2022/06 |
形態種別 | 学術論文 |
標題 | Communication and Information Aggregation for Multitype Information |
執筆形態 | 共著 |
掲載誌名 | SSRN Working Paper Series |
掲載区分 | 国外 |
著者・共著者 | Naruto Nagaoka, Tomoya Tajika |
概要 | This study introduces communication into the Condorcet jury model with uncertain precision of signals and examine how communication and majority voting aggregate multitype information. We consider common-value voting when the precision state, independent of the payoff-relevant state, determines the meaning and precision of decision-makers' (DMs') private signals related to the payoff-relevant state. Multiple senders with the same objective as DMs receive noisy signals about the precision state and send messages to the DMs simultaneously. We focus on equilibria in which when the sender's message suggests the possibility of a particular precision state, DMs vote presumes that the precision state is the particular state. We demonstrate that when the number of DMs is sufficiently large, senders transmit no information and hence information aggregation fails. Furthermore, we propose that, if senders' messages are aggregated to the binary level, information transmission is successful. |