ナガオカ　ナルト   NAGAOKA Naruto   永岡　成人    所属   広島修道大学  経済科学部    職種   准教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2019/11
形態種別	学術論文
査読	査読有り
標題	Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem under Strategic Voting
執筆形態	単著
掲載誌名	Economics Bulletin
掲載区分	国外
巻・号・頁	39(4),pp.2688-2696
著者・共著者	Naruto Nagaoka
概要	The Condorcet jury theorem states that if members' voting probabilities for the better alternative are identical and independent among members, and larger than 1/2, then the probability that a committee under simple majority voting chooses the better alternative is monotonically increasing in the committee size. This implies that the committee under simple majority voting decides more efficiently than single-person decision-making. This superiority of group decision-making under strategic voting for the binary signal model has already been demonstrated. We generalize this result and prove that the monotonicity property in the Condorcet jury theorem holds in the symmetric efficient equilibrium.