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NAGAOKA Naruto
Department Hiroshima shudo University The Faculty of Economic Sciences Position Associate Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2019/11 |
| Type | Articles |
| Peer Review | With peer review |
| Title | Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem under Strategic Voting |
| Contribution Type | Single-Authored Publication |
| Journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Volume, Issue, Pages | 39(4),pp.2688-2696 |
| Author and coauthor | Naruto Nagaoka |
| Details | The Condorcet jury theorem states that if members' voting probabilities for the better alternative are identical and independent among members, and larger than 1/2, then the probability that a committee under simple majority voting chooses the better alternative is monotonically increasing in the committee size. This implies that the committee under simple majority voting decides more efficiently than single-person decision-making. This superiority of group decision-making under strategic voting for the binary signal model has already been demonstrated. We generalize this result and prove that the monotonicity property in the Condorcet jury theorem holds in the symmetric efficient equilibrium. |