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NAGAOKA Naruto
Department Hiroshima shudo University The Faculty of Economic Sciences Position Associate Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2018/08 |
| Type | Articles |
| Title | Nonasymptotic Condorcet and Anti-Condorcet Jury Theorems under Strategic Voting |
| Contribution Type | Single-Authored Publication |
| Journal | SSRN Working Paper Series |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Author and coauthor | Naruto Nagaoka |
| Details | The nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem states that, under certain conditions, group decision-making by simple majority voting can decide more efficiently than single-person decision-making, in terms of having a higher probability of choosing the better alternative. Wit (1998) showed that the nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem holds under strategic voting in the basic model in which each member receives a binary signal. We examine the robustness of the nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem shown by Wit (1998) with respect to the assumptions of information structure. Our main result is that the nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem may not hold when the strongest signal that indicates a particular state is realized with probability less than 1/2. We provide a sufficient condition for this anti-Condorcet jury theorem with respect to the prior probability and the likelihoods of signals. |